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Abstract
This paper suggests that the euro has crisis signalled a significant political moment in the European public 
sphere. Analysing the crisis as a conflict between the European decision-making elite and European civil 
society, I propose that the concentration of decision-making in the euro crisis at the European level, and the 
growing public critique aimed at the supranational centres of power, may lead to the politicisation of European 
integration and contribute to strengthening the European public sphere.
Resumen 
Este artículo parte de la siguiente idea: la crisis del euro representa un momento político importante en la esfera 
pública europea. Si analizamos la crisis, entendida como un conflicto entre la elite y la sociedad civil europea, 
encontramos que por un lado se está centralizando la toma de decisiones a nivel europeo para la superación 
de la crisis del euro, hecho que, por otro lado, está provocando un aumento de la crítica pública dirigida hacia 
los centros supranacionales del poder. El presente texto explora si esta realidad en proceso puede favorecer una 
integración europea política y contribuir al fortalecimiento de la esfera pública europea.
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1. Introduction
The public sphere serves an elementary role in the operation of democracy. 
In Enlightenment thought, the public sphere forms a social domain between the 
ruling authority and the civil society of private citizens. As a space for the formation 
of public opinion and collective will, the public sphere allows citizens to take part 
in the definition of social goals and enables them to control, or hold accountable, 
the decision-making elite. Conversely, political rule legitimises itself by responding 
to demands and critique formulated in the public sphere. In this way, the public 
sphere becomes essential for the democratic legitimacy of political authority in the 
European social imaginary (Habermas, 1989; Koselleck, 1988; Taylor, 2009). 
Although such debates on European culture and its central values, including 
democracy, have continued at least since the Enlightenment (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005; Kaelble, 2002), the European Union (EU) as a political system has been built 
on an explicitly non-democratic basis (Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 268). Claims that the EU 
itself should be democratically governed have become more widespread only with 
the advancing political integration and accumulation of new competencies by EU 
institutions (Marks, 1997, pp. 31–3). Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth (2010) 
locate these claims in the particular political discourse that accompanied the new 
wave of European market integration in the 1980s (p. 4). Sketched by the Delors 
Committee in the late 1980s, and crystallised in the Maastricht Treaty, this project 
put forward a particular understanding of politics and democracy. According to its 
vision, a democratic EU would result from market integration: with the development 
of an internal market, the interests of European citizens would also automatically 
be channelled into decision-making. This is what Schulz-Forberg and Stråth (ibid.) 
critically label the hypocrisy of democracy-through-market.
Observing the contemporary crisis in Europe from such a political historical 
perspective, we might argue that the market-driven project of European integration 
has not only run into an economic cul-de-sac but has also fuelled a deepening sense 
of illegitimacy of EU institutions. The decision-making practices during the present 
euro crisis have only strengthened the perception among European publics that, 
despite the rhetoric of the treaties, European economic and political integration has 
been taken forward without concurrent democratisation. The widespread critique 
voiced by civil society suggests that, not only the neoliberal integration project, but 
also the associated European vision of democracy-through-market, is in crisis. Who 
better to summarise this sense of a loss in legitimacy than Jürgen Habermas, who, 
in a 2011 interview, claimed that Europe is at a crossroads with regard to the future 
of democracy:
Sometime after 2008, I understood that the process of 
expansion, integration and democratization doesn’t automatically 
move forward of its own accord, that it’s reversible, that for the 
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33 In this paper, European civil society 
is understood as the assemblage 
of associations, organisations and 
movements that bring social problems 
into public discourse and address the 
general, as opposed to private, interest 
(see Habermas, 1996, p. 367; Kohler-
Koch and Quittkat, 2009).
first time in the history of the EU, we are actually experiencing a 
dismantling of democracy. I didn’t think this was possible. We’ve 
reached a crossroads. (Cited in Diez, 2011).
Considering the blatant side-lining of democratic institutions and 
procedures in much of the decision-making during the euro crisis, and the 
erection of new disabling restrictions on the finance policy sovereignty of national 
governments, the perspectives for welfare and democracy in Europe are indeed 
grave. However, from the standpoint of European democratisation, this crisis 
may prove to be not just a negative event. The euro crisis can be viewed as a 
conflict between the European policy-making elite and European civil society,33 
with the European news media forming the mediating element in the public sphere 
in which these contesting groups potentially meet and (re)negotiate the future 
of European integration. If strengthened, the European public sphere may bring 
forward this conflict between the European power centres and European citizens 
and help to solve it. It depends on whether the European elite, which hold key 
decision-making powers in the euro crisis, can be made accountable and whether 
European political institutions can channel the political demands emerging from 
civil society into the decision-making.
This paper explores the prospects of the European public sphere in 
light of the recent developments in the euro crisis. I begin by reviewing some 
of the traditional problems cited when discussing the failures of the European 
public sphere in creating democratic legitimacy for European integration. The two 
subsequent sections outline some of the recent political developments in the on-
going euro crisis and reflect on their implications for the operation of European 
decision-making and its interaction with civil society critique. I suggest that we can 
interpret the euro crisis as an event in which both civil society and the European 
news media acknowledge the concentration of power at a European level, address 
the European decision-making elite and demand increasing public accountability 
of the European power centres. Together, the widespread anti-austerity protests, 
demands for expansionary economic policies and critique of EU’s democratic deficit 
amount to a growing questioning of the neoliberal integration project. In this context, 
I discuss the implications of the euro crisis for the strengthening of the European 
public sphere and whether the crisis could indicate a shift from the democracy-
through-markets hypocrisy to a new phase of democratisation-through-critique.
2. The weak European public sphere
Of course, the euro crisis does not mark the first time an event or 
controversy has brought the European institutional elite, the news media and 
their audiences together into a shared debate across the continent, thus making 
E-ISSN:2173-1071  IC – Revista Científica de Información y Comunicación 10 (2013) [pp. 75-98]
78 Markus Ojala
Europe a public issue. In fact, the EU, especially the regular summits of European 
political leaders, has become part of the routine news agenda for quality European 
news media, even if it tends to spark little discussion among European citizens in 
normal circumstances. More substantial debates on European matters have been 
connected to events deemed historically significant, such as the introduction of the 
euro (de Vreese et al., 2001), or the (failed) ratification of the Constitutional Treaty 
(Fossum and Trenz, 2007; Oberhuber et al., 2005). Moreover, the EU institutions 
and politicians themselves have at times become the focus of simultaneous 
attention in all parts of Europe, particularly when a scandal has gained, or has 
been granted, a European dimension. For instance, the controversy over the EU’s 
sanctions on Austria after Jörg Haider’s election win in 2000 and the corruption 
scandals in the European Commission have triggered transnational debates on 
the significance and legitimacy of the EU as a political entity and on the meaning 
of European values (Schmidt-Gernig, 2002, p. 70; van de Steeg, 2006). 
These shared news events have been of interest in a number of cross-
national comparative analyses on European political communication and the public 
sphere (see Machill et al., 2006; Peters et al., 2005). Many of these studies 
have indeed indicated a certain “Europeanisation” of public spheres, referring 
to a phenomenon in which European issues increasingly become discussed in 
the national media and within national political debates (e.g. Brüggemann and 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2009; della Porta, 2003; Erbe, 2005; Kevin, 2003). In 
addition to providing common international topics of discussion, European 
news events often involve more substantial dimensions of concurrence: shared 
discourses, frames, values, and constructions of European history and identity 
(Díez Medrano, 2003; Eide et al., 2008; Olausson, 2010; Pfetsch et al., 2004; 
Trenz, 2007; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Triandafyllidou et al., 2009). Not only do news 
media share a similar international news agenda, but they also often tend to look 
at European issues from much the same angles. However, given the primacy of 
the national media systems in Europe, the most widely shared perspective is, 
somewhat paradoxically, the one that adopts a national framework to coverage of 
European issues (Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2008; Preston, 2009).
The most notable feature of the European public sphere is its 
fragmentation into a multitude of local, regional, national and transnational publics. 
This fragmentation is reflected in the plurality of media outlets each gathering 
their own audiences, thus creating rather exclusive, specialised and limited 
spaces of public communication on European matters (Kevin, 2003; Corcoran and 
Fahy, 2009). The news media operate according to their own logic, remain rather 
separate from each other, and largely fail to mediate the debates between the 
European elite, national elite and civil society publics. In other words, the media 
are not capable of bringing together the transnational and national political elites 
and European civil society into a common European discussion (Eriksen, 2007; 
Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010). Indeed, European public communication has 
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remained so fragmented that, for many critical observers, it does not even make 
sense to speak of a European public sphere. For instance, Erik Eriksen (2005) 
has instead preferred to discuss specialised elite transnational networks and the 
communicative spaces they create as part of European policy-coordination and 
decision-making practices.
The failure of the mainstream media to integrate European publics 
in a common Europe-wide debate can partly be explained by their dependence 
on public authorities and decision-makers as their primary news sources. 
This news media elite bias has been indicated in many studies on political 
communication and media-state relations (e.g. Bennett, 1990; Robinson, 
2001), as well as in studies on European political communication (e.g. 
Koopmans, 2004; Statham, 2007). However, in the case of the European 
public sphere, a better term for the phenomenon might be a double elite bias. 
This is created when the news media primarily follow the European authorities’ 
agenda in the coverage of European matters, while balancing this focus with 
another elite bias, namely, by giving voice to the national elite’s views on the 
issues. In this way, the mainstream news media tend to adopt elite discourses 
and definitions of European political questions and their solutions while largely 
excluding civil society voices and the alternative definitions emerging from 
social movements and voluntary associations.
The double elite bias in the mainstream news media coverage 
of European issues threatens to narrow down publicly available political 
discourses. On the one side are the European decision-making elite, who are 
in charge of the EU’s policy formation, while on the other are the national 
political elite, which typically play into populist anti-EU sentiments and present 
the union as a threat to sovereignty, democracy, national economy and social 
welfare. While partly understandable, the habitual concentration on this clear-
cut conflict between the EU and the national institutions by the mainstream 
media results in a simplistic representation of the European political division 
as being one between the pro-European internationalists and the anti-European 
nationalists (cf. Linden-Retek, 2012). With the exclusion of European civil 
society voices from political debates, the news media effectively limit the 
discourse on Europe and frame it within the lines of more integration versus 
disintegration, without giving space to discussions on what kind of integration. 
Consequently, news journalism is in danger of promoting an image of the EU 
as an intergovernmental body, instead of a polity with internal ideological 
struggles over its political direction.
Of course, the news media are not the only institutions to blame for 
the problems in the European public sphere. Many other factors in the political 
system can explain why public communication on European matters has not 
resulted in a more coherent Europe-wide political debate or in the formation 
of a European public opinion in any meaningful sense. Scholars of European 
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politics often make general acknowledgements regarding the non-existence 
of a shared European identity, a European polity, a European public opinion, 
or, indeed, a European democracy (Mörä, 2009). Thus, the European public 
sphere cannot be analysed by examining the European media alone, but must 
be assessed against its political and institutional background. The capacity 
of the European public sphere to strengthen the democratic processes on the 
European level depends not only on the news media, but also on the capacity 
of the European political system to integrate into its decision-making critiques 
and demands formulated in civil society.
A major impediment to a functioning European public sphere is the EU 
itself as a political system. Relationships of accountability, representativeness 
and responsibility are vague in EU’s political system that occupies a place 
somewhere between a federal state and a federation of independent states. 
Moreover, the uneven integration process has led to a union that has a high 
concentration of power in some areas (as in monetary policy), but almost no 
power in others (as in fiscal policy). In the absence of a truly political union, as 
called for by Habermas (2001), the EU is in many ways ill-equipped to respond 
to public critique and to channel political demands emanating from civil society 
(Kohler-Koch, 2009). Unable to operate either democratically or effectively, the 
EU suffers from the lack of both input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy 
(Scharpf, 2011): on the one hand, the decisions made on the European level 
do not result from democratic deliberation among citizens and the channelling 
of their demands through the European political system, and, on the other, 
the EU seems increasingly unable to provide the citizens with solutions to the 
problems the polity is facing.
Therefore, from the perspective of the public sphere the institutional 
problem in Europe is not so much the lack of Europe-wide media or platforms 
of debate. The more acute problem is the absence of political institutions 
that could be referred to by European civil society. There is no political centre 
for the European public sphere with which citizens and their critique can be 
connected, and the decision-making elite public and the counter-public of civil 
society have remained separated. As a consequence, the European public 
sphere remains decidedly weak (Eriksen, 2007; Fraser, 2007): the public 
protests and critique are lost in the fragmented public sphere, and there are no 
real ways of channelling them into institutional political processes. Of course, 
the weakness of the public sphere only adds to the legitimacy problem of 
the EU and contributes to the rise of anti-systemic, or anti-European, political 
forces (cf. Karppinen, 2009). The ascent of nationalist populism in Europe, 
and particularly the rise of Golden Dawn in Greece, may partly be seen as an 
alarming indication of how the current management of the euro crisis is further 
increasing the sense of illegitimacy of European decision-making (van Gent et 
al., 2013).
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3. Elite decision-making and civil society critique 
in the euro crisis
Overall, the potential for the European public sphere to function as a 
platform for democratic deliberation and civil society supervision over political 
decision-making is severely hampered by its structural fragmentation, elite-driven 
information flows and the lack of clear institutional relationships of responsibility 
and accountability in the EU. As Aeron Davis (2010) has pointed out, a possible 
consequence of the inability of the public sphere to connect citizens with decision-
making processes is the isolation and insulation of the specialist elite public 
from wider social and political debates in society (pp. 132–4). In light of the 
discussion above, it is not difficult to find arguments for an existence of this kind 
of disconnect between the decision-making elite and civil society in Europe.
Since the spring of 2010, European authorities have designed and 
implemented a wide range of policies to specifically address the euro crisis. The 
crisis itself has primarily been presented in terms of market turmoil, particularly 
as one that is hampering the operation of banks and their lending practices 
by diminishing trust in the financial markets. This dominant elite interpretation 
of the nature of the euro crisis can be evinced in the way that many European 
bureaucrats and decision-makers, including Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Economic 
and Monetary Affairs, have habitually justified the policy measures with the stated 
intention of calming and stabilising the markets and restoring financial market 
confidence in the overall economy (e.g. Rehn, 2012, 2013b). 
Some of the policy measures have directly addressed the perceived 
liquidity crisis in the banks of the eurozone. Thus the European Central Bank (ECB) 
has not only lowered interest rates, but has also engaged in non-standard monetary 
policy responses and injected new money into the banking system in order to 
encourage banks to increase their lending to businesses and consumers and to 
kick-start growth again (Traynor, 2012; Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). Other 
measures have been more indirect in nature. Building confidence among banks 
in the soundness of the overall financial system has been the primary motive 
behind the 2010 and 2011 stress tests of the eurozone banks, conducted by the 
European Banking Authority, and behind the agreement on the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (EBA, 2011a, 2011b; ECB, 2013). Similarly, the famous public pledge 
by ECB President Mario Draghi to do “whatever it takes” to secure the stability of 
the financial markets and to prevent the break-up of the eurozone was made with 
the aim of convincing banks of positive future prospects and persuading them to 
increase credit flows to the real economy (Draghi, 2012a, 2012b).
Another primary interpretation of the euro crisis has been one of 
a sovereign debt crisis, referring to the rapid acceleration of interest rates on 
government debt to unsustainable levels in some of the eurozone countries. Of 
course, the interest rate hikes are directly linked to the broader financial market 
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turmoil, and are simply one of its manifestations: lenders have become to feel 
insecure about the capability of governments to pay back their accumulated debt, 
which has led to the rise of the interest rates on new credit (Patomäki, 2013, pp. 
75–76; Wray, 2012, p. 182). One part of the policy response to these fears have 
been the so-called bail-out loans to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, 
as well as the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility, the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the European Stability Mechanism to 
handle these bail-outs (CESifo, 2012; EEAG, 2012). In the meantime, the ECB has 
engaged in operations to purchase bonds issued by troubled governments from 
secondary markets in order to bring down the interest rates and thus alleviate the 
perceived risk of the break-up of the eurozone (Cœuré, 2013). The other part of 
the policy response has consisted of imposing strict austerity programs to reduce 
public spending, as well as reaching eurozone-wide agreements on the Fiscal 
Compact, and on the so-called six-pack and two-pack regulatory reforms. They 
have purportedly been designed to improve market confidence in the longer-term 
growth prospects and competitiveness of eurozone economies (Rehn, 2013a).
Regardless of the success of these various policy measures and the 
soundness of the economic rationales behind them, this brief and incomplete 
account serves to illustrate how active the European policy elite have been during 
the euro crisis. A great deal of the essential decision-making in the crisis has 
been taken at the supranational level in key EU institutions, and the crisis has 
intensified policy formulation by, and coordination between, the European Council, 
the Euro Group of finance ministers, the Commission and the ECB. The execution 
of monetary operations, creation of finance mechanisms, imposition of economic 
policies and structural reforms on debtor governments, as well as the formulation 
of new eurozone-wide regulatory measures, are, in turn, decisions that greatly 
affect and delimit parliamentary policy-making independence at the national level 
(Patomäki, 2013, pp. 94–95). The euro crisis has also witnessed the formation of 
new transnational coordinative and decision-making cliques, such as the Troika, 
which has organised the bail-out loans and overseen the accompanying structural 
reforms in debtor countries, and the Frankfurt Group, consisting of the leaders 
of Germany and France, as well as the heads of the Euro Group, the ECB, the 
European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. These unelected 
bodies have used considerable power over national parliaments during the crisis 
(Scharpf, 2011; The Economist, 2011). At the same time, the six-pack and two-
pack regulatory reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact have bestowed new 
supervisory and regulatory powers on the EU Commission and Parliament (EC, 
2013; Lemangnen, 2013).
The assumption of new responsibilities by the European institutions 
and the increased execution of power at the supranational level have not gone 
unnoticed by European civil society. As a response to the eurozone elite’s crisis 
policies, popular resistance has carried a substantial European dimension. Civil 
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society organisations (CSOs), political movements and public demonstrators across 
the eurozone, particularly in the worst-hit countries, have held the supranational 
bodies responsible for the social and economic crises and the crippling policies 
imposed on the public and private sectors (e.g. Kington et al., 2012; Phillips, 2011; 
Teevs, 2013; van Gent et al., 2013). Not only have there been many expressions 
of transnational solidarity among protesters in different eurozone countries, but 
demonstrators have also posited themselves directly against the European power 
elite (e.g. Durkin, 2013; McMahon, 2012; RT, 2013). 
In the public mobilisation sparked by the euro crisis, the constructed 
political divides have partly run along national lines. This can be observed, for 
instance, in the anti-German demonstrations in Greece and Cyprus and in the 
way ethnocentric discourses about the profligate southern Europeans have been 
mobilised with considerable success in some of the creditor countries (e.g. 
Kollewe, 2012; Pop and Kidner, 2012; Savaricas, 2013). The tendency of the 
mainstream media to nationalise issues has undoubtedly contributed to such 
discourses and to a focus on national politics in much of the euro crisis debate. 
However, despite these limitations posed by the media systems and journalistic 
practices, the public debate has also witnessed an unmistakably European frame, 
which has been evident in the critiques against austerity measures, European 
bank bailouts and other official crisis responses, as well as against the economic 
policy orthodoxy underlying these decisions. In this opposition directed at the 
European power centres, street protesters, social movements and CSOs have 
received public support from economists and political analysts who have grown 
increasingly disillusioned with the economic policy doctrines established by the 
eurozone elite and with their impact on the European economy. With highly visible 
interventions by influential economists, such as Paul Krugman and Paul de Grauwe, 
the questioning of the dominant crisis policy has entered the mainstream news 
agenda, and even in such elite media platforms as the Financial Times explicit 
denouncements have been repeatedly aimed at the eurozone decision-makers by 
prominent opinion leaders (e.g. Krugman, 2012; Münchau, 2013; Pérez, 2011; 
Wolf, 2011, 2013).
These developments point to a growing concentration of the public 
debate and political action on the European level, something that Habermas (2001) 
expected would follow from the gradual shift of power from national to European 
institutions (p. 17). It is now not only lobbyists and business organisations in 
Brussels that are involved in European politics, but also, increasingly, political 
parties, labour unions, CSOs, social movements and street demonstrators. As a 
consequence, the economic crisis in the eurozone has become deeply politicised; 
that is, it has been translated into an issue of political and social controversy all 
over Europe. The clearest indication of this politicisation is the way the EU has 
become a hot topic in a number of national elections since 2010 (Chryssogelos, 
2013). One of the earliest member states to witness the political impact of the 
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euro crisis was Finland, where the heated debate on the bail-out loans to Greece 
and Portugal significantly contributed to unprecedented gains for the Eurosceptic 
Finns Party in the 2011 parliamentary elections (Pernaa and Railo, 2012). Perhaps 
the most successful political mobilisation against the eurozone elite has thus far 
been the Syriza coalition, which established itself as a major political force in the 
Greek parliamentary elections of 2012 (Callinicos, 2012).
That the public critique and popular resistance against the dominant 
euro crisis policies have thus far impacted politics mostly at the national level 
is testament to the superior ability of national institutions to offer conduits for 
political change. At the European level, the corresponding channels are weaker, and 
changes are more difficult both to achieve and to discern. Admittedly, the growing 
popularity of anti-elite parties in many member states, and the deepening public 
controversy around the crisis policies, have caused some unease and tension 
among the EU elite (e.g. Neuger, 2013; Spiegel, 2013). Still, overall, and despite 
the public politicisation of the euro crisis, the European elite has been capable 
of manufacturing agreements and loan programmes and of selling, or imposing, 
their public sector cut prescriptions and other measures of internal devaluation 
on national parliaments and labour markets without facing a significant challenge 
or political alternative (Ruparel, 2012). As Davis’ (2010) warning concerning 
the isolation of specialist elites from more democratic and inclusive spaces of 
debate suggests, the European elite discourse has largely been insulated from 
any relevant criticism of the adopted policies. 
The actual policies pursued by the eurozone elite can be viewed in the 
context of this relative isolation and insulation: the highly unpopular bank bail-outs, 
publicly funded credit mechanisms, the devolution of parliamentary sovereignty 
over national budgets by supranationally supervised fiscal pacts and the paralysing 
austerity measures have all been pushed through regardless of the protests and 
critique voiced not only by civil society movements and organisations, but also 
by many mainstream economists regarding the immorality, undemocratic nature, 
economic counter-productiveness and outright harmfulness of such measures. As 
the European elite has disconnected from civil society, so has it lost its grasp of 
the real social crisis that is crippling Europe.
4. Implications of the crisis for the European 
public sphere
The question to be asked is whether the euro crisis might, over time, 
change the situation in ways that could bridge the gap between the European 
civil society and the decision-making elite, and strengthen the European public 
sphere in the process. In some ways, the euro crisis arguably differs quite 
significantly from any previous event or issue in the European public sphere. 
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34 The press coverage of the euro crisis 
is being studied from a cross-national 
comparative perspective in a project 
coordinated by the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism. Some 
early reports on the national data are 
available online and offer indications of 
the breadth of the euro crisis coverage 
across Europe. Reports are available at: 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/
research/research-focus-areas/business-
and-financial-reporting/the-euro-crisis-
media-coverage-and-perceptions-of-
europe-within-the-eu.html [Consulted: 11 
October 2013].
This prolonged crisis has meant that European citizens have, within their partly 
interconnected public spheres, already discussed the European debt issue for 
over three years. The debate has been atypically intensive, with the news media 
reporting new political and market developments practically every week, and the 
extensive time-span has made possible the introduction of new actors and ideas 
into the debate, as well as the elaboration of critiques and political alternatives.34 
Furthermore, the crisis has been significant in the way it has brought together 
political, economic and social dimensions, which have all become part of the 
same discussion.
In other words, the euro crisis has provided just the kind of continuous 
issue that Habermas (2001) deemed a prerequisite for the EU becoming a 
sphere of publics in which the citizens, albeit divided along national and other 
audience-specific lines, converge around a common topic and follow the relevant 
controversies in other countries and publics (pp. 18–19). It could therefore be 
argued that the euro crisis is unprecedented, not only economically, but also as 
a phenomenon of the European public sphere. As a result, awareness of the 
interconnected fates of not only European economies, but also the people(s) 
themselves, may have never been stronger and more widespread among 
European citizens than it is now. 
The significance of this growing public awareness of Europe’s economic 
and social importance for the lives of its citizens may become clearer when 
highlighted against the long history of European communication. Tracing the 
history of the European public sphere since the late 18th century, Hartmut Kaelble 
(2002) argues that, while European communication has traditionally been highly 
elite-centred, the debates on European issues have considerably intensified 
over the last decades, involving a wider range of groups in society on par with 
the region’s economic and political integration. Since the 1980s in particular, 
both expert communication and media attention have increasingly focused on 
European matters. As the EU’s political power has extended from common 
market regulation to other social fields, issues such as security, environment 
and immigration have also gained a European dimension in political and public 
communication. Moreover, with the increased presence of, and intervention in, 
the everyday life of its citizens, the EU has become a controversial issue in 
national public spheres.
The euro crisis fits neatly into Kaelble’s historical narrative of 
intensifying European communication, and seems to advance many of the 
developments that point to the gradual strengthening of the European public 
sphere. As argued in the preceding section, the euro crisis has evidenced a 
degree of concentration of decision-making and authority on supranational 
institutions, as well as a growing recognition of these European power centres 
among the European public. Discussion of European problems has consequently 
extended from the exclusive elite and expert spheres to civil society groups and 
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has involved even the general public, thanks to the intensive attention paid 
to the crisis by the national news media. Moreover, the Europe-wide debate 
on the merits of austerity indicates how the European public sphere has been 
capable of formulating shared vocabularies and mediating them across different 
language communities (cf. Blichner, 2007). 
Most importantly, in addition to its impact on domestic politics, the 
euro crisis has been significant in reinvigorating public debates on the direction 
and nature of European integration. As a consequence, the neoliberal market-led 
project of integration has been challenged from two sides. As the rise of Eurosceptic 
forces suggests, the crisis has given greater visibility to those demanding an 
overturn of the integration project and a return to national monetary and budgetary 
sovereignty in the form of a break-up of the euro. However, it has also given new 
impetus to calls for the democratisation of EU institutions, including the ECB, in 
order to make them better serve the EU-wide needs for employment and social 
security: overturning the neoliberal, market-led integration in favour of the more 
progressive and social democratic policies of Keynesian demand management, 
full employment programmes, balance of trade imbalances and greater regulation 
of financial markets (Patomäki, 2013). 
What do these challenges to European integration imply for the public 
sphere? The entire problem of the European public sphere, both as an academic 
and political concern, is closely connected to the overall process and politics of 
European integration. As Schulz-Forberg and Stråth (2010) point out, the idea of 
the European public sphere has primarily been raised in academic and political 
debates concerning the nature and direction of European integration towards 
a democratic EU. However, the actual dynamics behind the emergence and 
consolidation of the public sphere as part of overall democratisation have often 
been neglected in these debates.
Since the early 1990s, the EU’s political and institutional rhetoric on 
the European public sphere has primarily addressed the problem of democracy 
in terms of common identities and symbols. The official discourse has 
concentrated on the ways in which the European public sphere could create 
a sense of belonging and feelings of togetherness among European people 
(Horvat, 2013; Shore, 2000). Much of the academic research has followed suit, 
transferring to the European level a particular interpretation of the formation of 
national democracies, popularised by Benedict Anderson’s (1991) coinage of 
the notion of imagined communities, which emphasises the active invention of 
nations as an essential part of the construction of common identity and solidarity 
among citizens. For Schulz-Forberg and Stråth (2010), this model for European 
democracy manifests an ahistorical misunderstanding of the processes that 
led to the formation of nations (p. 16). Far from being a discursive invention 
from above, democratisation historically advanced through a complex process 
of social struggles and conflicts. Correspondingly, the public sphere should not 
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be viewed so much in Habermasian terms of rational consensus-promoting 
debate, but as a sphere for the expression of social conflict and critique.
As opposed to the Andersonian perspective of discursive imaginations 
and Habermasian notions of rational deliberation and consensus, Schulz-
Forberg and Stråth (2010) depart from Reinhart Koselleck’s (1988) ideas 
of democracy, politics and the public domain. In this argument, the public 
domain is used to formulate social critique and to address political authority, 
demanding its attention (Koselleck 1988, p. 53). Critique does not so much 
delegitimise political rule as recognise the existence of a sovereign and its 
rights to rule (ibid., pp. 118–119), but, if successful, the critique is capable of 
creating a widespread experience of a crisis in society, which the power centre 
must address in one way or another (Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010, pp. 
14–15). Thus a crisis, or public sense of a crisis, is an important moment in 
politics and democracy.
Schulz-Forberg and Stråth are, of course, not the only scholars to 
concentrate on conflict and critique in contrast with rational deliberation and 
formation of shared opinions as the basic dynamic of the democratic process. 
In particular, Chantal Mouffe (2005) has emphasised the importance of the 
agonistic struggles of suppressed groups in opening up the public sphere for 
new issues introducing them to the political domain. Without such continuous 
articulation of differences and conflicts in the public sphere, the political 
system is in danger of becoming de-politicised and losing its legitimacy. The 
public sphere, then, is a form of contention and conflict; it is concerned with the 
formulation of critique that forces the political power centre to respond to it.
As regards the dynamics of European politics and democracy, the 
present Europe-wide debate on the euro crisis suggests that the European public 
sphere is at least capable of facilitating opinion formation and critique. However, 
to become consequential the critique must have a clear political addressee; it 
must be directed at a sovereign authority that has the power to respond to 
the demands made in the public sphere (Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010, p. 
15; Fraser, 2007). As suggested by previous discussion, European CSOs are 
to some extent fulfilling their task and formulating such critique that identifies 
and addresses European power centres (cf. Kohler-Koch, 2009, pp. 51–52). 
The European media, in turn, are mediating these critiques among the general 
public in order for the shared crisis consciousness to grow. However, only when 
the domination of the economic crisis frame preferred by the European elite 
turns into a widespread sense of a social and political crisis can the elite be 
forced to truly address the euro crisis as a social crisis, instead of focusing on 
the interests of the banks and the financial sector. The euro crisis can mark a 
political moment in European history and serve its Koselleckian function in the 
democratic process only to the extent that power in the EU becomes both (self-)
identified and responsive to civil society critique.
E-ISSN:2173-1071  IC – Revista Científica de Información y Comunicación 10 (2013) [pp. 75-98]
88 Markus Ojala
5. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed some elements of the weak European public 
sphere and reasons for its historical inability to connect the counter-publics of 
civil society with the elite public of the decision-makers into a democratic public 
process of conflict and critique. This disconnect not only intensifies the sense of 
illegitimacy of the political order in Europe, but also affects the capability of the 
political system to formulate policies that would get Europe out of the current 
economic and social crisis. However, it is also possible to draw more optimistic 
interpretations from the euro crisis and recognise some positive future prospects 
for the European public sphere and democracy. 
Firstly, as the crisis develops, the inconsistencies in the elite narratives of 
it are likely becoming more and more pronounced, both with the help of, and despite 
the obstruction of, the mainstream media still hampered by its double-elite bias. 
Secondly, the prolonged crisis should offer increasing opportunities for CSOs and 
critical civil society voices to get their message through to the general public. The 
way in which the spring 2013 debates over the soundness of the economic theory 
behind the austerity policies, promoted by the European Commission in particular, 
were widely covered in the mainstream media offers a promising example (e.g. 
Brinkmann, 2013; Doncel, 2013; Hewitt, 2013; Steinbock, 2013). Thirdly, the 
crisis also encourages the construction of alternative European political projects 
that could be shared transnationally. Both CSOs and political parties can develop 
new forms of transnational connections and integration. The European leftwing 
parties are already attempting to devise shared programmes and construct 
political alternatives to the current neoliberal crisis policies (Dimitrakopoulos, 
2012; Palmer, 2012).
As a consequence, it may be that the critique formulated in civil society 
and presented in the public sphere does eventually get channelled through 
EU institutions. If we consider the recent moves by the eurozone elite, some 
indeed seem to address issues that have been promoted by European CSOs 
for many years. Good examples are the steps taken towards the introduction of 
the financial transaction tax and some of the agreed measures on tax havens, 
even if these have remained rather modest (EC, 2012; Patomäki, 2013, pp. 
89–94; Rettman, 2013). In the domain of macroeconomic policy, the ECB 
has adopted several measures, including bond-purchase operations to keep 
the governments’ borrowing costs within a tolerable limit, which many post-
Keynesian and neo-Keynesian economists alike have been advocating for quite 
some time (see, e.g., Wray, 2012). In addition, the debates between austerity 
and growth-stimulating policies in the Council and the Euro Group signal the 
influence that growing public pressures, caused by the lack of growth and rising 
unemployment in the eurozone, have on the political agenda of the European 
power centres (Simon et al., 2013).
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Insofar as such dynamics of conflict and critique between the European 
elite and civil society become reinforced in the euro crisis, the subsequent 
politicisation of the EU could even see us moving from a weak to a strong form 
of the European public sphere. The notion of a strong public sphere refers to 
an “institutionalised public sphere with a power centre as a point of reference 
and with institutionalised forms of representation, negotiation and deliberation” 
(Schulz-Forberg and Stråth 2010, p. 92). The strengthening of the European 
public sphere would mean that it no longer remains disconnected from European 
political decision-making. Rather, the public debate on European issues among 
civil society groups would be increasingly reflected in the political process and 
would have real consequences for the exercise of power.
Although these kinds of institutional arrangements could result from 
further political integration and centralisation of power at the European level, it is 
important to recognise that supranational authorities and powers already exist in 
Europe. Further consolidation of this power in the hands of particular institutions 
is not essential for the strengthening of the public sphere. What is needed now 
is to integrate the democratic element with the already existing institutions, 
organisations and practices of European politics. It requires public exercise of 
power: institutionalised ways of presenting critique, public arenas of political 
conflict and institutions responsible for channelling these debates into decision-
making (cf. Habermas, 2001). The construction of democratic legitimacy through 
a functional transnational public sphere would also mean a move from informal 
governance to institutionalised government (cf. Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, 2010, 
pp. 105–112).
A central question in this paper has been whether the euro crisis indicates 
a move towards a more politically viable or stronger European public sphere, and 
whether the crisis can lead to improved European democracy. Inevitably, the answer 
to such questions remains decidedly vague as there are contradicting indications. 
The European public sphere continues to suffer from the elite disconnect and 
from the institutional deficiencies of the EU. However, if the European elite remain 
committed to stay the course of budgetary discipline, which will most likely lead the 
continent to prolonged economic hardships with consistently high unemployment 
rates, we may see that a more democratic and social European integration project 
starts to gain strength. It is dependent on the European civil society’s ability to 
voice a united protest and to formulate a viable economic policy as an alternative 
to the dominant austerity orthodoxy, as well as on the ability of European parties, 
particularly on the left, to adopt these visions into a shared policy programme and 
to gain public support for such a project. Only in this way could we see a move 
from the hypocrisy of democracy-through-market of the past two decades towards 
a new phase of democratisation-through-integration.
The future of the European public sphere and democracy is decisively 
open at the moment. This is what a crisis, after all, is all about: it is a decisive 
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moment, a turning point – or, in Habermas’ words, a crossroads – in which 
the future direction is still unclear. Some involved in the euro crisis debate 
doubt that Europe could work as a democratic political entity and argue that 
the sovereign nation-states are the only spaces in which democracy can 
realistically be expected to function. We might ask, however, whether turning 
back the integration process and a return towards the rule of sovereign nation-
states are viable alternatives. Are national institutions capable of dealing with 
global problems, or do we need supranational forms of governance? If the 
answer is that transnational institutions of decision-making are in the European 
public interest, then the issue of the democratic legitimacy of such powers will 
not go away.
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